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Cyberspace is now recognized as a critical center of gravity for modern military 
forces. The ability to maintain operational networks, while degrading the enemy’s 
network capability, is a key consideration for military commanders. Conducting effective 
cyber-attacks against sophisticated adversaries requires the ability to develop, test, and 
refine cyber-attack scenarios before they are used operationally, a requirement that is not 
as well defined in the cyber domain as it is in the physical domain. This research 
introduces several concepts to address this need, and creates a prototype for cyber-attack 
scenario development and testing in a virtual test environment. Commercial and custom 
software tools that provide the ability to conduct network vulnerability testing are 
reviewed for their suitability as candidates for the framework of this project. Leveraging 
the extensible architecture of the Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) custom 
framework allowed for the implementation of new interaction parameters, and provided 
temporal specificity and target discrimination of cyber-attack scenario tests. The 
prototype successfully integrated a virtualized test environment used to simulate an 
adversary network and the enhanced MAST capability to demonstrate the viability of a 
cyber-attack scenario development platform to address the needs of modern offensive 
cyber operations. Based on these results, we recommend continued development 
of MAST with the intent to ultimately deploy to Department of Defense cyber operations 
teams. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s military, a computer network is an essential element of combat power 
with uses extending from command and control, communications, logistics, computer 
network attack, to computer network exploitation. Given the reliance of armed forces on 
digital networks to carry out an array of warfare functions, these strategic centers of 
gravity have become high priority targets in modern military conflicts. From the 
uppermost echelons of command to the most remote deployed units, the exploitation of 
enemy networks is key to military engagements now and in the future.  
In the traditional warfare domains of air, land, and sea, the ability to ascertain the 
capabilities and orders-of-battle (OOB) of adversary forces is well understood. This 
knowledge of enemy forces allows for the rigorous testing and refinement of warfare 
capabilities, which facilitates effective operational planning. Different parameters and 
scenarios can be set against an adversary’s capabilities, allowing for a variety of courses 
of action to be wargamed effectively. This ability to test warfare capabilities, from the 
operational to the tactical level, is a key element that ensures the military readiness of 
today’s combat forces.  
In the cyber domain, the ability to know an adversary’s capabilities, 
vulnerabilities, and OOB is less well defined. Furthermore, the need to be able to develop 
and test offensive cyber capabilities and scenarios against an accurate instantiation of 
enemy networks to ensure operational success is not as mature or robust as in the 
physical domain(s). To address that need, this research examined various tools, 
techniques, and existing software frameworks that could be used or modified to develop 
simulated attack scenarios for effective testing against virtualized adversary networks.   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Offensive cyber operations (OCO) are often executed without the ability to first 
simulate and test their effectiveness against a realistic model of an adversary’s network. 
Having such an environment could help cyber operators to better understand the effects 
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of specific cyber-attacks, their impact on an adversary’s systems and operations, and the 
collateral and secondary effects that could result.  
1. Primary Question 
How can offensive cyber tools and exploits be developed and tested effectively in 
a controlled environment against virtualized models of adversary networks? 
2. Secondary Questions 
What control mechanisms or methods would allow malware to focus on a user-
defined target set or grouping (e.g., a single host or single subnet)? 
What methods can be used to perform the temporal sequencing of malware? 
What methods would allow for the simulation of malware within a virtualized 
network?  
B. SCOPE 
The primary scope of this thesis was to design a methodology and lay the 
foundation for a process that can be used to design, develop, and test simulated cyber-
attack scenarios in a virtualized environment. The resulting methodology facilitates 
follow-on research and the creation of enhanced software capabilities for use in offensive 
cyber scenarios. The systems developed in this thesis are not intended to supplant 
existing DOD and service cyber test ranges, but are intended to serve a specialized need 
for the DOD cyber warrior in the early stages of scenario development  
Cyber mission planning, which precedes the development of cyber-attack 
scenarios, defines the mission objectives and desired end-state of any offensive cyber 
operation. Achieving those goals via cyber means requires distinct knowledge of the 
target network in order to create effects on different aspects of an adversary’s computer 
systems, which was a focus of this thesis. The mission planning aspects of offensive 
cyber-attacks, although they are a necessary first step to focus the simulation 
development, is beyond the scope of this thesis.   
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C. OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of this work was to provide a proof-of-concept via an 
established custom software framework that enables the development of software 
modules for use in simulated offensive cyber scenarios. An additional objective was to 
develop the capability for both temporal and target specificity in cyber-attacks. Finally, a 
virtualized test environment was needed to simulate an adversary network on which to 
demonstrate new offensive cyber capabilities developed and implemented in this 
research.  
D. APPROACH 
A survey of several existing technologies and customized solutions that attempt to 
develop and test cyber-attack schemas was performed to evaluate each of their suitability 
as a candidate for the foundational platform. Then, after identifying the advanced 
interaction parameters needed to enhance the simulated malware’s usability, software 
modules were designed to support the integration of new capabilities into the customized 
framework selected as the foundation. Finally, a prototype was implemented to 
demonstrate scenarios to test the interaction behaviors, and set the conditions for follow-
on research.  
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This work has devised, designed, and implemented advanced simulated malware 
interaction methods to provide the U.S. cyber warrior with more accurate methods for the 
design and testing of advanced cyber-attack simulations. These new capabilities will also 
allow DOD and U.S. cyber forces to model adversary capabilities and responses with a 
higher degree of precision in order to more effectively conduct wargames and test various 
strategies and courses of action prior to an actual conflict. As a result, cyber-attack 
developers will have greater confidence that their cyber-attack scenario will perform as 
planned. This will enable the cyber simulation designers to provide a high level of 
assurance to their senior leaders that the virtually-derived cyber-attack scenario will 
perform as planned in the physical world.  
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F. ORGANIZATION 
The rest of the thesis is organized in the following manner: 
Chapter II: Background. This chapter examines basic concepts and definitions 
commonly used within the cyber lexicon. Additionally, this chapter surveys existing 
software tools and frameworks to determine their viability as the foundational platform 
for the development of simulated cyber-attack scenarios.   
Chapter III: Design and Methodology. This chapter puts forth key design 
requirements for the creation of a virtual environment in which to conduct simulated 
cyber-attacks against a virtualized adversary network. It also reviews different 
approaches to realize the virtualized test environment, and different interaction 
methodologies for the simulated malware to provide results that translate into real-world 
solutions. Finally, it defines factors essential to the optimization of the virtualized 
environment for testing offensive cyber operations.  
Chapter IV: System Implementation. This chapter details the test environment, 
the creation of the new software modules, and the testing process. It also reviews the 
design, use, and capabilities of the test environment utilized to model an adversary 
network. Additionally, the chapter examines the functions of the new software modules 
and demonstrates the derived interaction behaviors and their applicability in offensive 
cyber scenarios.   
Chapter V: Conclusions and Future Work. This chapter examines the results of 
the implemented software modules and their effectiveness within the test environment. It 
also reviews the software framework for its efficacy as an execution platform. 
Additionally, areas that can be enhanced further to provide more robust interactions with 
even greater capabilities for the offensive oriented cyber scenario author are identified. 





The extensive use of cyberspace to conduct worldwide communications, 
commerce, and banking, as well as to provide the control of critical national 
infrastructure, has made the connectivity that cyberspace provides indispensable for 
operations in modern societies. In a military context, the use of cyberspace has become 
intricately woven into most military operations—creating greater efficiencies, but also 
providing a new attack surface an adversary might exploit to wage war. The ability to 
conduct successful attacks in the physical domain(s) requires detailed planning, robust 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as methods to rehearse and 
simulate the attack. Although the cyber domain has many differences from the traditional 
physical domains, such as the speed of execution, they share common elements for the 
execution of a successful attack—detailed planning, good intelligence, and repeated 
rehearsals to ensure every detail of the plan is correct. In the cyber domain, the ability to 
be able “rehearse” attacks via offensive cyber operations continues to be a pressing need 
within the U.S. military. However, the requirement to find software or network 
vulnerabilities and then develop exploits as either an attacker or a defender of computer 
networks has existed for many years. It is through this nexus of common needs that we 
examine the following software frameworks.  
In this chapter, we survey existing software products and methods that could 
provide a framework within which these exploits and simulated attack scenarios could be 
developed. Our review examines both custom-designed and commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) products to determine the range of existing capability available, and how well 
each could meet the DOD’s needs as a lightweight, tactical based system that could be 




This section defines common terms used in the cyber operations lexicon that are 
necessary for an understanding of the development of simulated attack scenarios. 
1. Exploit 
An exploit is the means by which a pen-tester or malicious actor uses a flaw or 
vulnerability in some software, system or service to penetrate a system or network of 
interest. Common examples of cyber-attack exploits are buffer overflows and 
manipulation of security misconfigurations (i.e., default passwords) [1].   
2. Payload 
A payload is the code that will create the desired effect that is delivered by 
the exploit. An exploit is, metaphorically speaking, a delivery vehicle for the cyber 
payload. Software such as a Trojan horse or a reverse shell are common examples of 
a payload [1], [2]. 
3. Penetration Testing 
Penetration testing is the process of testing a network or system by “simulating 
real attacks to assess the risk associated with potential security breaches” [1]. Using 
various software tools, the pen-tester will attempt to uncover vulnerabilities in a system, 
and exploit them in an attempt to simulate how a real threat might attack the system [1]. 
4. Red Teams 
Red teams are groups whose task is to “to emulate the adaptive character of an 
enemy” [3]. In effect, they can challenge the network defenders utilizing similar tactics 
and procedures that a particular adversary might utilize. Their true strength lies in their 
ability to portray properly the thinking and methods of a real-world adversary [3]. 
5. Network Sandbox  
A network sandbox is a metaphorical reference in computer security to a separate 
and isolated network space that can be used for testing or developing malware, or any 
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software that could potentially damage the system outside the prescribed environment.   
Common techniques to create this network isolation include physically air-gapping the 
network, utilizing hardware/software virtualization, or leveraging other features of the 
operating system that keep a process confined to a subset of the system [4]. 
6. Black Hat 
Black hat is a term used for individuals with extraordinary computing knowledge 
who use their skills and abilities for malicious activities, such as illegally breaking into 
computer networks or creating viruses. The term is a reference to a commonly held 
cultural association of the fictional evil character wearing a black hat [5], [6].  
7. White Hat 
White hat is a term used for individuals with extraordinary computing knowledge 
who use their skills for defensive purposes; they may also serve as computer or network 
security analysts. Again, the term is a cultural or stereotypical reference to fictional 
white-hatted characters who enforce the law, or who are represented as virtuous [2], [6].  
C. MAVNATT  
The Mapping, Awareness, and Virtualization Network Administrator Training 
Tool (MAVNATT) is a software framework developed at NPS in 2015 to enable tactical 
network administrators the ability to train on and evaluate live networks [7]. MAVNATT 
provides three core capabilities: 1) the ability to map a network, 2) the ability to maintain 
awareness of the changing status of the mapped network, and 3) a virtualized 
instantiation of the mapped network that can be used for training network administrators 
and situational awareness of user activity [7]. This description of the MAVNATT 
framework will be brief, as the full details of the MAVNATT framework and project are 
described in Daniel McBride’s thesis, “Mapping, awareness, and virtualization network 
administrator training tool (MAVNATT) architecture and framework” [7]. 
The MAVNATT framework was designed to demonstrate that a “lightweight 
system can be utilized in tactical environments to provide training and evaluation 
capabilities to tactical network administrators without jeopardizing the unit mission and 
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without jeopardizing the network on which users are operating” [7]. The MAVNATT 
architecture consists of three separate components or modules—Mapping, Awareness, 
and Virtualization—all connected through an underlying framework. Its design, depicted 
in Figure 1, portrays the interrelationship between the modules and the scope of 
responsibility of each component. The Mapping Module interfaces with and acquires the 
network topology data from the live network [8], while the Virtualization Module 
interacts with the virtual representation of the live network through virtualization 
management software. The Awareness Module maintains the symmetry of the 
architecture as it interacts with both the live network and virtualized network and is the 
nexus for the monitor and train functions [9]. 
 
Figure 1.    MAVNATT Conceptual Model. Source: [7]. 
1. Mapping Module 
The Mapping Module is responsible for mapping and enumerating the 
components of a network, and their connections, to determine the physical topology of 
that network [8]. The resultant information is parsed into an open-format graph file that 
contains information on the attributes of each host, and their interconnections [8], [9]. 
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Once the open-graph format file has been created, it may be passed to the Visualization 
Module to be instantiated as a virtual network by the hypervisor [9]. The Mapping 
Module will continue to update the open-graph format file with updates from the 
Awareness Module to reflect changes in the live network configuration.   
2. Awareness Module 
The Awareness Module’s function is to provide a visual representation of the 
network devices in an estimated topological layout based on their attributes and 
connections, and the status of the various components in the network [7]. This visual 
representation permits a user the ability to quickly gain and maintain situational 
awareness of the network under examination. This module also provides the additional 
capability of allowing virtual devices to be inserted into the network representation to 
facilitate training scenarios [7]. 
3. Virtualization Module 
Once the Mapping Module has created the open-graph file of a live network, the 
Virtualization Module uses the file data to create a virtualized instantiation of the 
network in a logically separate partition. This module also creates the interface between 
MAVNATT and a hypervisor to support the creation of the virtual network [7], [9]. 
D. MAST  
The Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) system utilizes a three-tiered 
client-server model, that was designed to be able to test an organization’s users, 
administrators, and security tools [10], [11]. An overview of the MAST architecture is 
shown in Figure 2. It consists of a top-level Scenario Generation Server (SGS), a second-
tier Scenario Execution Server (SES), and a third tier comprised of the MAST client(s). 
This architecture allows the SGS to be geographically disparate from the SES and the 
MAST client(s) [11]. 
MAST uses two types of files to facilitate its operations, client module files and 
scenario files. Client module files are what contain the core malware simulation code 
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known as Simulated Malware (SimWare), while the scenario files contain instructions for 
particular clients to run specific client modules [11] . 
  
Figure 2.  MAST Three-Tier Client Server Architecture. Source: [11]. 
1. Scenario Generation Server 
The SGS sits atop the tree structure of MAST and is responsible for many of the 
command level functions. It installs as a Java desktop application program and can be run 
from a local or remote location to control the execution server(s) [11]. The SGS is 
responsible for: 
 Generating and disseminating training scenarios 
 Providing a central repository for all available scenarios 
 Controlling connected Scenario Execution Servers  
 Running independent scenarios on multiple networks simultaneously. 
2. Scenario Execution Server 
The SES is the middle-tier of the MAST architecture, receives commands from 
the SGS, and communicates directly with the MAST clients. The SES also handles the 
execution of the scenarios on the clients and requires a local install on the operational or 
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target network for training [11]. As the middle manager of MAST, SES is responsible for 
a number of intermediate tasks that include [12]: 
 Distributing SimWare and scenario files to MAST clients 
 Maintaining MAST client and SimWare status 
 Overseeing all scenario activity and MAST clients 
 Handling “kill switch” functionality in case of emergency shutdown 
 Maintaining a copy of deployed SimWare and scenario files. 
3. Scenarios 
MAST Scenario files are a compilation of SimWare modules along with various 
options and commands needed to run them. These scenario files or scripts allow the tester 
to combine various amalgamations of the SimWare modules as needed to exercise 
various features on the system under test. The SGS and SES run these scenario files and 
collect the results, and in some instances respond with the appropriate “reply” in 
accordance with the scenario parameters [11].  
4. Clients 
The MAST client software is a Java program that runs on each of the client 
machines that is a part of the MAST test network [10], [11]. The client application is 
controlled by the SES and does the following: 
 Reports the status of the running scenario to the MAST SES 
 Lists all the modules that are installed on the host client to the MAST SES 
 Executes the scenario as directed from the MAST SES. 
5. Simulation Malware modules 
MAST SimWare modules contain the code that provides the malware mimicking 
behavior and are at the heart of the MAST framework. These mimics can simulate a 
range of malevolent behaviors such as scanning, pinging, and hijacking of browsers. 
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Additionally, these malware modules could be identified as a particular type of attack by 
their binary signature matching a known type of malware [11].   
Due to the modular nature of these software objects and the extensibility of the 
MAST framework, new SimWare modules can be developed to mimic more advanced 
malware and then be inserted for use into the MAST framework.  
6. Graphical User Interface 
The MAST framework also has a Graphical User Interface (GUI) that allows for 
the starting, stopping, and selection of various scenarios that can be executed. The GUI 
also provides a way to visualize the feedback from the clients controlled by the SES. 
Additionally, the MAST GUI and the server instantiation can be on different computers 
and in different locations due the GUI’s client-server based architecture. An example of 
the MAST GUI, as shown in Figure 3, displays the scenario information, client 
properties, and the network of computers being tested with MAST. 
 
Figure 3.  MAST Graphical User Interface. Source: [10]. 
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7. Evolutionary Progress
Malware Mimics, now known as Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST), 
is a software framework based on the NPS thesis work of William Taff and Paul Salevski 
in 2011 [13]. Their software framework, Malware Mimics, was designed to meet 
the following objectives: 1) provide a system for training system administrators that 
could mimic malware on live networks, 2) allow the mimicking system to be 
geographically separate from the system or network being tested, and, 3) cause no 
harm to the live system being used as the training environment. Their original system 
provided a useful network-testing tool that could complement Red Team pen-testers and 
provide additional monitoring and testing capabilities to network administrators. 
In recent years, several NPS students have made enhancements to the original 
framework. In 2012, Justin Neff compared the Malware Mimics framework, renamed 
MAST, to other commercial software platforms to determine the effectiveness of MAST 
as a training tool. He concluded that MAST was a useful and effective tool that provided 
significant complementary capability to Red Team activities [14]. Also in 2012, Ray 
Longoria Jr. proved that the MAST framework was capable of scaling to support a large 
number of additional clients without significant detrimental impact to the remaining 
system and network resources [15].  
In 2013, Aaron M. Littlejohn and Ehab Makhlouf proved that the MAST 
framework was able to perform its training and malware mimicking functions on a 
shipboard LAN, using the Common PC Operating System Environment (COMPOSE) via 
the Navy Cyber Operating Range (NCOR) [16].   
Following this, Brian Diana, in 2015, identified security vulnerabilities within the 
MAST framework, and recommended encrypting its communication channels, and 
developing an authentication scheme for its modules [12]. Subsequent work by Adam 
Farber and Robert Rawls in 2015 addressed the security concerns raised by Diana by 
implementing secure communication between the endpoints, and a digitally signed 
verification protocol between the Generation and Execution servers of MAST. Also in 
2015, Erik Lowney published the MAST Communication Protocol (MCP), which 
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allowed MAST to synchronize scenarios across the network, and implemented the 
emergency “kill switch” behavior which allows the MAST server(s) to immediately 
terminate the simulation scenario [10], [11].  
Finally, in 2016, Gregory Belli published a scenario scripting language for MAST 
to allow the incorporation of multiple malware mimics into a scenario file. These 
scenario files can be customized, saved, and run on any instance of a MAST client.   
Additionally, Belli described the ability for MAST to be responsive to signals received 
from MAST clients and to reply with programmed responses to simulate complex 
interactions between MAST and the client [10].  
E. SURVEY OF EXISTING TOOLS AND METHODS 
The desire to be able to test one’s own network systems via a collection of 
software exploits that a black hat attacker or white hat tester might utilize has spurned the 
creation of several commercial and open-source products that provide that penetration 
testing capability. Their continued improvement over the last fifteen years has led to 
robust products that contain an array of features [1], [17], [18]. As a result, several of 
these open-source and COTS penetration-testing products are used by a variety of 
government, academic, and commercial organizations for routine testing of their own 
networks.    
In sections B and C of this chapter, we examined a few custom software 
frameworks that that were architected explicitly for the design and development of 
simulated malware (SimWare) attack scenarios and the mapping, awareness, and 
virtualization of networks (MAST and MAVNATT, respectively). In the following 
survey, we review some of the more common penetration testing tools for their ability to 
be used to develop and test simulated cyber-attack scenarios. We assess if they could 
provide a software framework or methods that could be useful in the development and 
testing of simulated cyber-attack scenarios and serve as a basis for this research effort. 
The evaluation criteria, as mentioned earlier, will be: 1) a software framework in which 
to create the malware mimics and provide a mechanism to start, aim, and control said 
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exploits; 2) a testing environment in which these created exploits can be exercised and 
tested; and 3) methods to observe the resulting behavior in the testing environment.  
1. Metasploit Framework 
The Metasploit Framework (MSF) is a software framework for penetration 
testing. It has been available to the public since 2004, has undergone many revisions over 
the years, and was acquired by Rapid 7 in 2009 [1]. The MSF is an open-source product 
that is free to download; however, the makers of the MSF also offer two commercial 
versions (Metasploit Express and Nexpose Ultimate with Metasploit Pro) that provide a 
web interface, increased automation, and more robust reporting features that are available 
for $5,000 to $13,000 USD, respectively [1], [17], [19]. 
The MSF has a rich set of features that enable it to be a premier penetration 
testing tool but MSF also has additional capabilities that lend themselves to the 
development of simulated cyber-attack scenarios. One of the foremost capabilities of 
MSF is the ability for users to develop and deploy their own custom designed modules. 
Within the context of MSF, a module is any collection of code that can be executed 
within MSF (i.e., an exploit or a payload) [1]. MSF also comes preloaded with hundreds 
of common exploits and payloads written in the Ruby programming language. Any of 
these can be edited or modified to form a new payload or exploit that may be needed for a 
particular scenario. Additionally, MSF contains a class of auxiliary modules that are used 
to perform non-exploit tasks such as scanning, fuzzing, or brute force password cracking 
[1]. These auxiliary modules can be modified and customized, providing an additional 
range of capabilities when developing simulated cyber-attack scenarios. Moreover, if the 
needed exploits exist in another programming language, C for example, MSF facilitates 
the porting over to the exploit to the MSF. This creation, customization, and porting 
capability of new and existing modules allows for a wide variety of exploits and auxiliary 
functions to be added to the framework, thereby allowing for the development of wholly 
custom attack scenarios [1]. These MSF modules are analogues to the code segments that 
are run by the MAST clients; however, the MSF modules were not designed to mimic 
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malware and simulate the behavior of an exploit or payload, but to be the actual 
exploit/payload.  
MSF also provides three methods to aim, launch, and interact with the various 
stock or custom-developed MSF modules. These methods are the terminal-like MSF 
console, the Armitage GUI, and the Meterpreter shell. The MSF console allows a user to 
launch exploits, create listeners, and access all the settings within the MSF using 
instructions typed at a command prompt. The Meterpreter is a shell-type interface that 
allows the user to interact with an exploited machine and utilize the full suite of MSF 
features. The Meterpreter can utilize a full range of organic MSF commands, but also 
supports creation of new scripts to provide any needed functionality that a user may 
require [1]. The Armitage GUI is a full-featured interface allowing a user to click and 
select the various services of the framework with standard point and click methodology. 
From the GUI, all the commands and preloaded exploits that are available in the 
framework can be selected and executed. Figure 4 is an example of the Armitage GUI, 
which shows the range of attacks the framework has identified for a particular host based 
on its vulnerability scan.   
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Figure 4.  Example of Metasploit Armitage GUI Interface. 
The MSF also provides a testing platform called Metasploitable, a Linux-based 
virtual machine. This virtual machine is designed to be a test platform that a user could 
use to test stock or custom developed MSF modules against [1]. Although it is a 
functional test environment, Metasploitable lacks the ability to be rapidly customizable to 
add any components that would be needed to test against specific hardware, operating 
systems, network configurations, or embedded intrusion detections systems.   
Overall, MSF provides a powerful architecture for penetration testing; however, 
the testing environment that comes with the framework is not highly customizable nor 
does it provide a method to simulate an intrusion or host detection systems within a 
network construct. Additionally, the MSF modules are not designed to simulate exploits 
and payloads but to be an actual instantiation of said payload/exploit, which differs from 
a MAST type instantiation of modules that utilize SimWare for their attack scenarios 
while the MAVNATT system can utilize its generic virtualization capability to produce a 
customized simulated testing environment.  
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2. SafeBreach 
SafeBreach is a software penetration testing tool that utilizes SafeBreach’s 
proprietary collection of known offensive network penetration techniques, their 
“Hacker’s Playbook™,” via an automated penetration-testing algorithm it continuously 
attempts to penetrate a target network throughout a customer’s network [20]. Their 
algorithms are then able to identify the vulnerabilities in the target system and 
suggest remedial actions to a network administrator or the penetration tester. The tool 
can also simulate infiltration methods across the entire cyber-attack kill chain 
(i.e., Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and 
Control, Actions on Objectives), and provide continuous validation of risks while staying 
up-to-date with the most current black hat methods and techniques [21].  
SafeBreach uses a two-tiered architecture to administer its penetration-testing 
services. The first tier consists of the software simulators that are deployed on a 
customer’s network which attempt to establish connections to network devices [20]. 
These simulators are analogous to the MAST clients described in Section C of this 
chapter. SafeBreach utilizes a cloud-based service, the Orchestrator, which contains the 
proprietary algorithms that control and direct the simulators based on their feedback from 
connection attempts and other actions. The algorithms then determine what penetration 
tactics to try next. Similar to the MAST architecture, the SafeBreach Orchestrator 
performs the combined functions of the SGS and SES servers in MAST as detailed in 
Section C of this chapter. Additionally, SafeBreach system developers frequently update 
their algorithms with the newest black hat methods as they are discovered to provide a 
more robust and up-to-date product [20], [21]. 
A graphic example of how the SafeBreach system can identify a vulnerability 
and show the network route of penetration to the point of data compromise [20] is shown 
in Figure 5. In this figure, a particular breach scenario has been executed from their 
Hacker’s Playbook by the controlling algorithms of the Orchestrator. Between each 
numbered pivot point, SafeBreach indicates how many exploits were tried and how many 
exploits successfully overcame the security at that point and an attempt to graphically 
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depict the steps and exploits an attacker could use the penetrate this system. SafeBreach 
also provides suggestions about how these vulnerabilities it found can be remedied [21].   
 
Figure 5.  SafeBreach GUI Identifies Route of Attack. Source: [20]. 
SafeBreach differs from some other penetration-testing tools, such as MSF, in that 
it offers continuous testing of the networks over time utilizing intelligent algorithms to 
direct the attack, as compared to a snapshot view provided by other static or batch 
processing oriented software penetration testing tools. This continuous validation and 
retesting through various network and software upgrades, patch installs, and other 
network changes that could introduce new vulnerabilities is one of the main features of 
this product. Pricing of the system is based on the number of simulators deployed. 
The base level contract of ten simulators with a service agreement for one year is 
$50,000 USD [20].  
The SafeBreach system also uses models to represent the behavior of malware to 
increase the accuracy and realism of their testing process. By modeling the malware in 
much the same way as a vaccine uses an inert copy of a virus, SafeBreach stimulates the 
defenses of the host system to verify a proper reaction. This malware modeling is another 
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similar concept that is utilized by the MAST framework [21]. However, the SafeBreach 
platform does not lend itself to the development of wholly new attack scenarios or 
exploits, and neither does it offer a way for these exploits to be tested in a rapidly 
configurable and benign test environment.  
3. Core Impact 
Core Impact from Core Security is a software framework that provides 
vulnerability assessment and penetration testing of target networks. Core Security has 
been providing an ever-increasing, sophisticated suite of tools that provides network 
detection, vulnerability mitigation, and access management penetration testing and 
vulnerability assessment since the late-1990s [18]. 
Their flagship product, Core Impact, is able to execute a suite of automated 
penetration tests across all avenues of access to a user’s systems—network, web, and 
mobile—and identify areas in need of security remediation. It is also able to enhance the 
effectiveness of perimeter defense and anti-virus systems, while ensuring detected 
vulnerabilities are remediated through continuous retesting. It provides a GUI to facilitate 
the system testing with their provided exploits. An example of the Core Impact Pro GUI 
is shown in Figure 6, which depicts the modules or attacks available on the left-hand side. 
In the center panels of the GUI, the network and hosts options are selected and show the 
discovered hosts in the test network in the panel below. The executed modules and their 
associated log information are displayed in the left-hand panels.  
Core Impact also allows for dynamic integration with third-party products, such 
as the Nessus vulnerability scanner, to increase its range of capabilities. Core Impact is 
used by global enterprises such as Credit Suisse, MasterCard, and Dell EMC. A standard 
deployment of the product can be purchased for approximately $40,000 USD [22]. 
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Figure 6.  Core Impact Pro User Interface 
Like the MAVNATT network mapping tool, Core Security provides another 
product called Core Insight, which has a virtual machine that is able to rapidly map a 
network environment. It compares the mapped information against an extensive list of 
vulnerabilities to find the ones that absolutely need remediation. This product costs 
$66,000 USD for the virtual machine, which also comes with the support of two remote 
auditors [23].   
Although, the suite of Core Security products provides an array of useful features, 
the ability to wholly customize or create unique attack scenarios is not one of them. It 
also lacks an organic test environment (virtualized or actual) as it is designed to test, 
scan, and execute against a user-specified network.  
4. Simulation Modeling
Another approach used by Kistner, Kuhl, Costantini, and Sudit, researchers at 
Rochester University, was to model computer networks, intrusion detection systems 
(IDS), and the behavior of the network as an alternative way to simulate cyber-attack 
scenarios [24]. Their approach requires knowledge of the system or network being tested 
to construct an accurate simulation model, and uses the Arena® discrete event simulation 
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software to demonstrate the concepts. IDS sensors are placed throughout the simulated 
network to produce real alerts based on the type of network traffic they observe in 
keeping with the realism of the simulation. Their model allows the user to construct a 
simulated test network and then devise, build, and execute various cyber-attack scenarios 
against this network via a GUI. The attack scenarios can be generated manually or 
automatically, and allowing for the specification of the path through the network as well 
as timing of the attack. Parameters for stealth, efficiency, and skill of the attack may be 
set to adjust the behavior of the cyber-attack scenario. Once the cyber-attack scenario is 
created, it can be saved and run on different computer network simulations [24]. 
This simulation model was designed primarily for testing cyber-attack scenarios, 
but it also can be used by system administrators to conduct testing of various cyber-attack 
methods against a simulated model of their own networks. An example of a simulation 
model in the Arena software GUI is shown in Figure 7. The ability to create custom 
devices in the Arena software to model machines, connectors, and subnets allows for the 
quick setup of customized computer networks used for testing of the cyber-attack 
scenarios. 
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Figure 7.  Sample Network Model with Arena Interface. Source: [24].  
The cyber-attack simulation model produced by these researchers addresses the 
full range of criteria we were reviewing in the various commercial tools. The simulation 
tool also allows a user to customize additional behaviors to mimic various skill levels of 
an attacker such as stealth, skill, and efficiency to various levels while setting up the 
attack scenario [24]. However, this was only a research project performed in 2007 and 
was detailed in the paper “Cyber Attack Modeling and Simulation for Network Analysis.”  
Although the tool is not available for purchase, it does reveal an ingenious method to 
create cyber-attack simulations using an unrelated software tool as a foundational base.   
5. STEPfwd
The STEPfwd (Simulation, Training and, Exercise Platform) platform is an online 
cyber/information assurance workforce development tool developed by the Computer 
Readiness Emergency Team (CERT) at the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie 
Mellon University, a federally funded research and development center . 
As a training tool for cybersecurity personnel, STEPfwd has a robust capability to 
provide virtualized training simulations that closely mimic real-world infrastructures and 
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attacks [25]. Two proprietary technologies used by STEPfwd to enable this robust 
simulation environment are Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute’s Virtual 
Training Environment (VTE) and CERT’s Exercise Network (XNET). The VTE 
facilitates the knowledge and skill building phase of the training encounter by providing 
online access to cybersecurity material in the form of technical demonstrations, lecture 
slides, and written materials [25]. XNET is a centrally managed infrastructure platform 
that allows remote instructors to create customized, full-scale cyber exercise scenarios to 
simulate real-world environments. Users are also able to customize scenarios by creating 
their own network environment, events, and timeline with the added ability to inject 
attacks/anomalies, create robust traffic generation and modify the timeline or event 
library. The XNET console also supports the participation of multiple cyber operators 
from different locations on the same scenario via its cloud-based architecture to facilitate 
real-world interactions between participants on a complex interactive scenario while 
creating an experience-building event. [25].  
The designers of the CERT ecosystem also had to address the scalability issue 
regarding the storage requirements (memory & disk) that several hundreds or thousands 
of Virtual Machines (VM) all running simultaneously would consume using the standard 
paradigm of taking snap shots. They developed a customized virtualized solution that 
modified the snapshot process of the hypervisor to use a single base disk to produce other 
needed instances of guest VMs [26]. For example, this method can use a single base disk 
image of a Windows 2012 server and create a snapshot to instantiate a domain controller, 
an Exchange server, and a web server and so on while staying within their hypervisor’s 
storage limits. An illustration of this virtualized solution and the savings that can be 
realized in disk storage and server memory by using one base disk image versus the 
traditional method of snapshots creating multiple restore points for a single image is 
shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  Design implementation for STEPfwd and XNET. Source: [26].  
This allows for the creation and startup of an entire exercise environment in just a 
few minutes with a few base disks, installation scripts and a startup sequence on one or 
more servers as needed. This architecture forms the core of the VTE and the SEI’s CERT 
STEPfwd system [26].   
In a 2009 U.S. Air Force Cyber Operations defensive network training event, 
CERT was able to provide a scenario using the XNET platform that “encompassed the 
anatomy of a real attack—reconnaissance, botnet and malware staging, data exfiltration, 
and massive communications disruption—and involved more than 100 virtualized 
computers and infrastructure devices” [25]. This example highlights the range of 
capabilities of the STEPfwd system with regard to the development of cyber-attack 
scenarios. If the emphasis were put on developing virtualized cyber-attack scenarios and 
using real defensive-minded operators in the testing process, this tool could be a very 
powerful instrument in the development of offensive cyber weapons. As an online or 
cloud-based solution, it provides tremendous scalability and allows for collaboration 
between geographically disparate teams and team members.  
The STEPfwd and XNET systems provide a range of capabilities that could be 
used for the development of simulated attack scenarios against virtualized adversary 
networks. Specifically, they provide the means to develop complex attack scenarios, a 
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virtual environment to execute these scenarios within, and an ability to monitor the 
scenario as it progresses. However, as a virtualized online solution, these systems are not 
able to map new networks, nor can they be used in an operational environment, as 
MAVNATT can.  
6. Summary of Existing Tools and Methods 
The purpose of this survey was to examine some software tools that are available, 
both commercially and custom developed, to ascertain what exists currently and if an 
existing product could meet the requirements to serve as the foundational platform for the 
development of simulated cyber-attack scenarios. The evaluation criteria, as described in 
the beginning of the background section, were used to determine which of the surveyed 
products would be best for the foundational base of the thesis research.   
The commercial products examined demonstrated a strong portfolio of features; 
however, the Safe-Breach and the Core Security products, although very robust, lack the 
ability to design unique attack scenarios. Conversely, the MSF does allow for the design 
and development of user designed exploits, modules, and scripts to be created, 
implemented, and utilized against a user-specified target network. MSF also provides an 
exploitable Linux ISO (a CD-ROM image saved in ISO-9660 format) for use within a 
virtualized environment to experiment with newly created or existing exploits.   
Although not as mature or robust as the surveyed commercial products, 
MAVNATT does more closely align to the original evaluation criteria of providing a 
software framework that provides the ability to create custom cyber-attack scenarios, an 
organically generated virtual testing environment wholly separated from the live network, 
and a method to observe the resulting behavior in the testing environment. MAVNATT, 
as part of its “train” mission, was designed to be able to interact with the MAST 
framework via Virtual Machine Disk (VMDK) files allowing the MAVNATT 
Virtualization Module to render an interactive session with a virtualized MAST 
instantiation [9]. This capability of MAVNATT makes it an ideal foundational platform 
for the stated goal of this thesis to develop simulated cyber-attack scenarios for use 
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against virtualized adversary networks. A comparison of various features of the tools and 
frameworks examined in this chapter is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Commercial Tool Summary 
 Metasploit Core Impact Safe Breach Arena STEPfwd
Host OS Platform All Primary OSes Win OSes All Primary OSes* Win OSes Web based
Custom Scenarios Yes No No Yes Yes 
Organic Test Env  Metasploitable No No Yes Yes 
Cost Free ~ $40,000 ~ $50,000 $90/seat/month Variable 
API Yes Yes, 3rd Party No* No No 
 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a high-level overview of MAVNATT and its core elements, 
and examined the architecture of MAST. Additionally, it provided a survey of some of 
the more widely used commercial products for penetration testing to ascertain the 
suitability of these products as a base element for the work of creating simulated cyber-
attack scenarios. The next chapter provides a thorough examination of the necessary 
elements for developing robust and realistic simulated cyber-attack scenarios.  
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III. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
Effective design, implementation, and testing of simulated cyber-attacks require a 
number of components, to include the following: knowledge about the target network, 
requirements of the virtualization platform, and a method to handle imperfect knowledge 
about the target system or network. We examine each of these components in detail, as 
well as the different interaction parameters for simulated cyber-attack software, and the 
implementation strategies for modeling such methods to mimic real-world network 
interactions. Finally, we outline the key requirements of a simulation environment 
necessary for planning, developing, and rehearsing offensive cyber operations. 
B. VIRTUALIZED ATTACK SCENARIO NEEDS 
The existing software products and methods reviewed in the previous chapter 
demonstrate an array of capabilities that could be used for developing and simulating 
offensive cyber-attack scenarios. Modeling cyber-attacks in a simulated or virtual 
environment, however, requires additional components and information, such as detailed 
knowledge about the network that will be attacked, and a virtualization or hardware-
testing platform that can replicate the target network to a very high degree of fidelity. The 
size of the network to be modeled is also an important data point since it will affect 
the hardware solution used for virtualization. Furthermore, if the cyber-attack scenario is 
to simulate effects in the physical world (e.g., by acting on supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems), those systems and their associated hardware 
must be modeled accurately to achieve relevant results. Finally, knowledge of 
the adversary network will likely be imperfect, which can introduce uncertainty into the 
derived cyber solution 
1. Network Knowledge 
Creating a simulation that would have a high probability of success against a real-
world system first demands knowledge of the target network. At its core, offensive cyber 
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operations uses the network knowledge to determine a vulnerability that can be 
subsequently exploited. The knowledge of the network consists of some, if not all, of the 
following information: network specific (IP addresses, network topology, domain 
names), host specific (user names, architecture type(s) (e.g., x86), OS variant and 
version, services running, ports open/closed), and security specific (firewalls, IDS/HBSS 
running with associated detection methods, password complexity requirements and 
change frequency), and physical security of the network (e.g., locks, keycards, hardened 
facility) [27]. This knowledge allows the offensive-minded operator to bypass target 
defenses and enter the system to achieve the mission objective(s). Knowledge of the 
network vulnerabilities can be achieved through active or passive computer scanning, 
and intelligence gathering through traditional sources of human, signals, and open 
source methods. 
To acquire knowledge about an adversary network via computer means would 
require following the process that white- or black-hat hackers use when gathering 
intelligence on a network. This process is referred to as the hacking phases [28], and is 
used to glean information about the target system before a tactical cyber-attack scenario 
is devised. Two well-known models, which outline the phases, are described by the 
Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) association and by Stuart McClure’s “Anatomy of a 
Hack” in the book Hacking Exposed [29]. The two models share the same objective but 
differ slightly on terminology and number of steps in their respective approach. The 
general steps of these hacking phases are as follows: 
 Reconnaissance 
 Scanning 
 Gaining Access 
 Maintaining Access 
 Covering Tracks.          
The first two steps are common to most models, although the term footprinting 
may be used instead of reconnaissance. The need to find out about the target system, its 
defenses, its software variants and versions, and its outward facing configurations are the 
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objectives of these initial steps. Reconnaissance is a preparatory phase in which 
information is gathered about the target organization, its network, employees, and 
operations. This step can be performed using passive methods such as searching 
through publicly available records and data, or with more active methods that involve 
interacting with the target directly. Additionally, traditional methods of espionage 
(human and signals intelligence) can also be employed to gather information or to recruit 
and use human sources with placement and access to gain greater knowledge of an 
enemy’s systems. 
A more aggressive form of network discovery involves scanning the adversary 
network to reveal an array of logical and physical information about the target systems. 
The information gathered through scanning could include operating system software that 
is being run by the target machines, a list of active hosts, the status of computer ports on 
the hosts, services that are running, and the network topology. A number of popular 
commercial tools can carry out these scans, such as Nessus [30] and Zenmap [31].    
The knowledge gained about an adversary network, its services, applications, and 
vulnerabilities during the reconnaissance and scanning phases enables the subsequent 
steps in the hacking process. Moreover, this information is critical for creating an 
accurate network model on which to simulate and test cyber-attacks. The network 
information that could not be ascertained, be it operating system software on some hosts 
or proprietary software on a router, would require assumptions to fill the gaps. These 
assumptions could significantly weaken the efficacy of the network model, which 
reaffirms the importance of obtaining knowledge on the adversary network. 
2. Virtualization Platform 
A key requirement of the virtualization platform would be the capability to model 
a large selection of computer and network devices accurately for the test environment. 
This modeling of computer devices could be done via a physical instantiation of the 
target network or be completely virtualized. For the former alternative, cyber test ranges 
have been built by the DOD at a number of different sites, such as the National Cyber 
Range (NCR) and the Navy Cyberspace Operations Range (NCOR). A detailed 
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discussion of the capabilities of these cyber test ranges can be found in the thesis by 
Nathaniel Hayes, “A Definitive Interoperability Test Methodology for the Malicious 
Activity Simulation Tool (MAST)” [32]. For this research, we focused on virtualized test 
environments, which could provide a portable and customizable solution to simulating an 
adversary network for offensive cyber operations. 
A hypervisor is commonly used for developing a network of virtualized hosts. 
Hypervisors normally work in one of two ways. One method is to run the hypervisor 
directly on the host machine’s firmware (Type I / bare metal); the other is to layer the 
virtualization application on top of the host machines OS (Type II / hosted) [33], [34]. 
Both implementations are used to allocate the physical resources of the host machine for 
the virtual machine instantiations. MAVNATT utilizes a Type II hypervisor for its 
virtualization module, while SEI’s XNET uses a Type I hypervisor implementation [9], 
[25]. The hypervisor implementation shown in Figure 9 illustrates a Type I bare metal 
implementation on the left, and a hosted (Type II) model on the right. In either case, the 
virtual machines always interface with the host machine through the hypervisor, never 
directly to the host machine’s hardware or OS.  
 
Figure 9.  Illustration of Different Hypervisor Implementations. Source [34]. 
The incorporation of device-specific information gathered about the adversary 
network into the virtualized environment is vital. This requires a virtualization capability 
that could instantiate hosts, connectors, subnets, and routers in a way that allows for the 
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input of the device’s defining characteristics, as captured during the intelligence 
gathering phase (active services, open/closed ports, operating system software, and 
software patch levels). Moreover, the virtualized network environment should also be 
able to simulate regular network traffic and noise in the test environment in order to 
simulate the realism of a physical network. The noise would provide the additional 
network traffic that could cause bottlenecks, reduced availability of network services and 
other congestion issues that the simulated malware should be able to overcome. 
Another important requirement of the virtualized network is that it should 
properly simulate the network defense mechanisms (i.e., IDS, HBSS, firewalls and 
others). These network defenses should be configurable, just like they are on a physical 
network, and should respond to proper provocations from SimWare. These simulated 
network defenses should also employ a range of common detection algorithms, which 
should include the following: signature-based, host-based, and hybrid variants of the two. 
Finally, the ability to support an omnipotent administrator role with multiple 
simulation participants is a critical need to support a large-scale simulation environment 
testing complex cyber scenarios. Multiple defenders or offensive cyber warriors should 
be able to collaborate within the virtualized environment while working on the same 
problem to mimic real-world interactions. Additionally, the scenario administrator would 
have the capability to dynamically add or remove events from the scenario, such as a 
Denial of Service (DoS) event, and be able to review each participant’s response(s) to the 
scenario and the injected events.    
3. Scale Factor 
The size of an operational network to be virtualized is a key consideration when 
simulating cyber-attacks. Many modern networks are comprised of hundreds or even 
thousands of devices, all interacting and communicating according to the activity of 
individual users and automated processes. The ability to replicate a large network in a 
virtualized environment would be required in order to conduct accurate simulations of 
real-world network systems. 
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For the simulation to have a high degree of accuracy, each individual virtualized 
object would need to incorporate all of the information acquired about its real-life 
counterpart. To have this degree of fidelity in the network model would require 
significant amounts of computing resources. However, to have the capability to conduct 
network simulations and offensive cyber scenario development in a tactical environment 
would require some significant tradeoffs in either the fidelity of the model or the size 
of the network modeled. Each alternative would carry significant risk to the derived 
cyber solution. 
4. Accounting for the Unknown 
When developing a virtualized attack scenario, imperfect intelligence of the 
adversary network must be recognized and accounted for. This awareness of one’s own 
lack of knowledge, known as “Socratic ignorance” [35], highlights the importance of the 
unknown elements of the enemy network. Similarly, when trying to accurately model the 
computer system of an adversary, many factors cannot be known with a high degree of 
certainty, which could significantly affect the precision of the network simulation. Such 
factors could include the fluidity of real-world networks, the time lag of patch releases to 
application, the frequency of penetration tests, advanced proprietary IDSs, active 
defensive measures, and the variable actions of network operators and defenders.  
Real-world networks are frequently upgraded, patched, reconfigured, and 
penetration tested, creating a rapidly changing target for simulation. This results in 
incomplete knowledge, and thus imperfect modeling of an adversary network. This 
shortfall can cause cyber-attack scenarios to be developed and tested in an imprecise 
simulation environment, leading potentially to failed cyber operations against the enemy 
network. Furthermore, the perishability or obsolescence of cyber-attack methods is a very 
real issue in cyber mission planning as most cyber weapons depend upon the exploitation 
of a vulnerability in the target system to achieve their mission effects [36]. These 
vulnerabilities could be remedied in the course of an adversary’s normal cyber hygiene 
yet remain unknown to offensive cyber operator. This could render the cyber weapon 
based on that vulnerability inert.  
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Another unknown about the adversary network that generates problems for the 
creation of an accurate simulation is the type of IDS being used and the type of detection 
schema employed. The IDS could either be host-based or network-based and use either a 
signature based or behavior based algorithm or combination thereof. If the intrusion 
detection scheme cannot be determined with certainty, the simulated cyber-attack 
solution may not perform as expected in the physical network.  
A target’s employment of active defensives is also challenging to replicate in a 
simulated environment. Active defenses refer to proactive cyber security measures that 
may be taken by an organization to defend its operational networks. These measures 
could include denial and deception techniques such as tarpits or honeypots [37]. Tarpits 
are a defensive computer technique used to delay incoming connections with a slow 
response from the server, while honeypots provide an inviting albeit false target for 
attackers [37], [38]. Their active defense measures could also consist of hunting teams, 
who are highly skilled cyber defenders who actively seek out malicious software on their 
network that has evaded passive security measures such as firewalls and anti-virus 
scanners [37], [39]. These active defensive methods may be approximated to some degree 
in simulated environments, but the behavior is difficult to replicate perfectly. 
Finally, the skill level and resilience of the enemy cyber defender cannot be 
known completely. The resilience factor would be difficult to replicate in simulations, as 
it varies by individual cyber operator, depending on their dedication and work ethic. The 
skill level of individual operators can result in a large variance across an organization that 
represents expertise peaks and valleys that can occur over the course of a day, week, or 
month. Furthermore, there is the changing dynamic of improving skills through advanced 
training or declining skills through inactivity of the individual cyber defender. 
In summary, numerous aspects of operational networks are either highly dynamic 
or hard to quantify, and therefore difficult to model precisely. There are ways to quantify 
the skill level or expertise of cyber defenders by defining and implementing interaction 
parameters into the simulation, but imperfect knowledge of dynamically changing 
computer systems, and unknown active defenses could introduce a degree of uncertainty 
into any simulation. 
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C. INTERACTION PARAMETERS 
Creating accurate simulations of offensive cyber operations requires interaction 
parameters that can define the behaviors of SimWare. These parameters can modify the 
manner in which the SimWare traverses through the network to accurately mimic real-
world behaviors. The interaction parameters can also allow for complimentary behaviors, 
such as skill and stealth, to be combined to form a new hybrid behavior that affects 
SimWare differently than either would independently. In the following section, various 
interaction parameters will be defined and described as to how they could enhance the 
network simulation. 
1. Propagation 
Propagation refers to how SimWare will move through the simulated network, 
either by self-propagation or by some other means. A self-propagating selection would 
not require another program to act as a conveyor and could leverage network resources 
and its associated connectivity to spread. Furthermore, the way in which the propagation 
parameter affects SimWare must emulate standard network routing protocols, and must 
address its interaction with security measures such as firewalls, network/port address 
translations, and active defenses. 
2. Specificity 
Specificity refers to the ability of a SimWare module to discriminate a particular 
target with a high degree of precision. The Stuxnet virus provided an example of malware 
that was highly focused on a very particular target, the specific make and model of the 
Iranian centrifuges used at Natanz, but did not damage any other systems [40]. 
Specificity would ensure that the SimWare would target a particular media access code 
(MAC) address, IP address, or SCADA device, while not affecting any other systems on 
the network. If the SimWare module were not able to find its specific target, it would do 
nothing or try to move onto another system to keep searching for its target.  
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3. Timing 
The timing parameter provides temporal control of when a SimWare module 
executes its intended behavior. A simulation might include, for example, a timeline of 
various SimWare cyber actions, each with timing dependencies such that one action must 
be completed before another. The ability for the SimWare to act only after a certain time 
has passed or a particular event has occurred is crucial to realistic modeling. The Y2K 
bug, although not malware, is a good example of a software problem that was triggered 
by a specific time event.  
4. Stealth 
Stealth refers to how well a cyber-attack avoids detection [24]. Conducting a 
cyber-attack in stealth mode will require extra precautions, and may not necessarily result 
in the most expedient traversal of a network. For example, maintaining stealth may 
require traversing through authorized ports that expect encrypted web traffic, such as port 
443, or having malware be resident on an existing process or daemon to avoid leaving 
any trace in memory. These methods, although stealthy, are not the most expedient ways 
to achieve the desired cyber effect.  
5. Efficiency 
Efficiency relates to how directly an attack will proceed [24]. A SimWare module 
with a high efficiency selection would not take steps to avoid detection, traps, or detour 
around obstacles. High efficiency would be desirable when the shortest time for the 
malware to achieve its effects is the most important factor. A high efficiency value 
applied to SimWare would be analogous to walking through the front door to burglarize a 
house because it is the quickest way to get to the intended target. Although, doing so 
would result in being caught on the security camera instead of crawling through an open 
upstairs window which would take more time (lower efficiency), but might avoid active 
surveillance systems (greater stealth).  
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6. Skill 
This interaction parameter is used to determine the probability that the cyber-
attack will overcome the simulated network’s defensives and obstacles [24]. In the 
physical world, a skillful thief can efficiently pick locks, evade security systems, and 
avoid leaving behind any physical traces of his activities. Similarly, in a virtualized 
environment, SimWare with a high skill level may have a higher likelihood of evading or 
bypassing computer defenses. 
7. Summary 
These interaction parameters form the basis of interaction methods within a 
simulated attack scenario. These methods could be controlled by allowing the user to 
select a numerical value from a range with a low value of one to a high value of ten. The 
algorithms of the simulation would then resolve the parameter governing the interactions. 
For example, if a SimWare module had a high stealth value (nine) and a high skill value 
(seven), then it should be able to overcome most defenses while remaining hidden. The 
simulation software would also need to modify the propagation rate, and interaction 
results based on the input selections of the modifiers.   
D. SIMULATED ATTACK REHEARSAL ESSENTIALS 
As cyber operations become more complex and more highly integrated with 
kinetic operations, the need for better collaboration and rehearsal between cyber and 
physical domain operators becomes increasingly critical. A visual and sequenced run 
through the plan with all the participants used to enhance understanding is a common 
technique in the physical domain known as a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC). For a 
virtualized network to be used effectively in ROC drills, a number of capabilities are 
necessary. These include the ability of the test environment to do the following: to reset 
and reconfigure the environment rapidly, provide a large menu of configurable SimWare 
options to achieve various effects, set timelines for activities and their execution, 
incorporate intelligence on vulnerabilities of the adversary’s network or system, and an 
ability for autonomous testing of the simulation. 
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1. Reset and Reconfigure 
For a virtualized network to be used effectively for testing offensive cyber 
operations, its simulated environment should be resettable and reconfigurable quickly and 
efficiently. This would include the capability to do the following: add or remove 
components to the simulation, modify components with new parameters that take effect 
immediately, save simulation run results with used network parameters run, and capture 
the behaviors of each simulation participant.  
2. Menu of SimWare 
Another important factor for OCO planning and rehearsal is the ability to quickly 
select and utilize SimWare modules from a menu. The ability to match capabilities to 
intended effects is referred to as weaponeering in the military lexicon [41]. Once the 
desired cyber effects have been determined from earlier planning efforts, achieving those 
effects will depend upon the ability to rapidly test various cyber-attack capabilities on a 
simulated adversary network. Moreover, new capabilities may need to be developed if 
repeated testing proves the existing tools are not able to achieve mission objectives. A 
detailed SimWare menu allows a cyber operator to quickly scan through the available list 
of tools to find a particular tool, or combination of tools, that could exploit the identified 
vulnerability and create the desired effect in an expeditious manner.  
3. Timelines 
Being able to see a timeline of various events in the cyber-attack simulation is a 
key capability for planning and rehearsing offensive cyber-attacks. As a scenario 
becomes increasingly complex, with multiple participants and interdependent effects, the 
need to precisely coordinate the different elements and effects will become more 
pronounced. The ability to add SimWare behaviors and events onto a timeline would be 
indispensable to structuring advanced time-interdependent simulation scenarios. The 
SimWare menu could be configured to add or remove various events and attacks on a 
timeline to aid in the planning of cyber-attack simulations. An illustration of how such a 
timeline might be presented to the user is shown in Figure 10.  
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A visual script that depicts cyber events from STARTEX to ENDEX. 
Figure 10.  Visually Scripting the Timing of Various Cyber Events. Source [42]. 
4. Vulnerability Intelligence 
Cyber-attack scenarios are commonly focused on target network vulnerabilities 
determined during the information-gathering phase. To conduct a successful cyber-attack 
against an adversary network will require knowledge of identified or high-probability 
vulnerabilities. By utilizing the hacking steps described earlier in Chapter III and 
exploiting the determined vulnerabilities, we can start from the public-facing Internet to 
compromise the external network, and then repeating the process to penetrate the internal 
network, which is depicted in Figure 11. For both the external and the internal network, 
the vulnerabilities facilitate the system breach. Having an external public-facing presence 
and a private internal enclave, as shown in Figure 11, is a common design for many 
secure networks. Different variations of a cyber-attack scenario can be rehearsed based 
on the desired mission effects, the vulnerabilities identified, and the cyber tools available. 
 
Cyber-attack scenario traversing from Internet to External network to internal network 
using hacking phases. 
Figure 11.  An Overview of a Cyber-Attack Scenario. Source: [24]. 
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5. Automated Testing 
When developing cyber-attack scenarios with imperfect intelligence of the target 
network, the capability to perform automated testing would be especially valuable. 
Defensive measures that prevent scanning of the target network can obfuscate network 
host parameters such as operating systems, active services, and open ports. Iterating 
through all the possible variants for these unknown factors could result in thousands, if 
not millions, of different network permutations.  
An automated testing capability in the virtualized environment could provide the 
ability to execute the prescribed cyber-attack scenario against a virtualized adversary 
network while each time varying a parameter of the adversary network. The automated 
testing could relieve the cyber scenario developer from the precarious task of making 
assumptions for the unknown attributes of the adversary network and extrapolating the 
results of a limited number of test runs into a confidence factor for the derived cyber 
solution. Some of the commercial systems examined in Chapter II exhibit some 
automated testing features. The MSF allows a Hail Mary style attack where every exploit 
in the framework repository can be launched at a particular host or network without the 
need to configure each individual attack. SafeBreach also supports a similar penetration 
test mode that will continuously attempt to penetrate a customer’s network in attempt to 
provide real-time awareness of any new vulnerabilities. 
As both the networks to model and the number of unknowns of the enemy 
network grow, the ability for automated testing would become an essential element of a 
robust cyber scenario development platform. In the recent Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) Cyber Grand Challenge (2016), seven autonomous machines 
competed in a capture-the-flag computer hacking competition in Las Vegas, NV [43]. In 
capture-the-flag, teams are responsible for protecting their server data (the flag) while 
trying to find, diagnose, and fix their own vulnerabilities. At the same time, they attempt 
to exploit another team’s vulnerabilities to capture their flag. For the first time ever, these 
algorithms competed at this human-centric game in 96 rounds of 270 seconds each. The 
algorithms developed 421 replacement binaries and detected 650 vulnerabilities, some of 
which were unknown to the challenge creators [44]. This challenge demonstrated that an 
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automated, machine-speed, vulnerability detecting and patching system is a real 
capability [45]. These algorithms could form the basis of an automated testing capability 
for a DOD offensive cyber scenario development platform to aid with the testing of 
derived cyber-attack solutions against many permutations of an enemy network.  
With the ability to run many thousands of tests of the proposed cyber scenario 
solution against many permutations of the enemy network, a large array of test results 
would become available. These results could provide the basis for an analysis, which 
could determine which combinations of variables from the enemy network and the 
derived cyber solution resulted in success. Using the resulting analysis, a cyber scenario 
author could associate a high confidence factor to those cyber solutions that achieved a 
greater degree of success against multiple variations of an enemy network. 
E. ATTACK TYPES 
A primary goal of this thesis is to define and develop the capability to simulate 
cyber-attacks. A key component of this capability is to identify the various attack 
categories available. Cyber-attacks can be classified in different ways based on their 
methods, capabilities, and various attack vectors, but in general they can be grouped into 
four main categories: reconnaissance, access, denial-of-service, and data manipulation 
[46]. These categories enable attacks on all components of computer system security, 
where confidentiality represents the prevention of unauthorized viewing, integrity refers 
to the prevention of unauthorized alteration, and availability is a measure of the 
operational readiness of a computer system and its data when needed. 
1. Reconnaissance 
Attacks in this category focus on information gathering. The information acquired 
does not directly compromise any part of a computer system’s security, but is a necessary 
step to enable the other categories of attacks. Reconnaissance uses open source 
intelligence (OSINT) gathering methods to leverage publicly available information about 
a target network and its systems through overt collection. This may include such 
methods as accessing public records on people associated with the target, or researching 
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Internet Protocol (IP) registration information through the American Registry of Internet 
Numbers [46].  
Another aspect of reconnaissance is electronic intelligence gathering on the target 
network, using network and port scanning techniques such as nmap or traceroute. The 
data gathered might consist of connectivity of the various hosts on the network, the 
software environment running on each host, status of server and security settings (e.g., 
which ports are open or blocked), network protection software (e.g., HBSS), and 
computer architecture employed (e.g., scalable processor architecture). The types of 
methods used, and the data acquired, are similar to information gathering techniques 
mentioned earlier in Chapter III (Section B.1 Network Knowledge), however the topic 
is readdressed here as it is a relevant part of the attack taxonomy when developing 
cyber scenarios.  
2. Access
Access-based attacks include methods that focus on gaining or elevating privilege 
to unauthorized computer resources [46]. A user attempting to gain privileged access 
could be an individual or part of a group external to the target organization, or it could be 
a trusted insider attempting to gain higher authorization than his privileges allow. Most 
computer systems today use a password-based identification and authentication system as 
a first line of access protection. Using password-based attack methods to determine user 
passwords via brute force, trying default passwords, or cracking a password file are 
among the techniques used to circumvent this first level of defense [47].  
Social engineering and phishing techniques are used by attackers to gain 
privileged access to a target system. Social engineering techniques attack authorized 
users by presenting a plausible ruse or questions that persuade the user to divulge their 
password or other sensitive network data [48]. Phishing is a particular form of email-
based social engineering that attempts to entice the authorized user to innocently access a 
malicious web link that will install malicious software on the user system, providing 
system access for the attacker. This class of attacks compromises a computer system’s 
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confidentiality by overcoming access restrictions and providing key benefits that would 
be advantageous in the development of most cyber-attack scenarios. 
3. Denial of Service
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks compromise the availability of computer systems 
to their intended users. DoS attacks can be accomplished in a number of different ways. 
A common method is to flood a targeted network or system with requests so that the 
target cannot provide service to any valid user. A more aggressive form of denial uses 
many computers to overwhelm the targeted network with traffic. This distributed denial 
of service (DDoS) can be effected using hundreds or thousands of compromised hosts, 
known as a botnet, that are controlled by the attacker’s system [46].  
Another DoS attack surface uses methods that cause the target computer or its 
software not to function correctly. A buffer overflow attack exploits software flaws that 
allow an input field or parameter in a program to accept too large data, which then 
overwrites legitimate computer data in the software’s memory space [48]. By overwriting 
a portion of memory called the execution stack with invalid inputs, or more seriously, 
illegal instructions or malicious code, the attacker can cause the system to crash or allow 
an attacker to gain control of the host. This technique can lead to a DoS to the targeted 
computer system.  
4. Data Manipulation
These types of attacks can compromise the integrity of computer systems’ data. 
These attacks often exploit vulnerabilities in networking communication protocols [48], 
using techniques such as Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing, man-in-the-middle, and session 
hijacking and replay attacks. The ability to alter data to/from a target computer system 
provides a cyber-attack scenario an array of capabilities. For example, commands to a 
SCADA device could be altered to elicit a range of desired effects (e.g., shutdown, reset, 
or ignore safety limits), as could modified orders/messages used for command and 
control purposes.  
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Internet protocol spoofing allows an attacker to deceive defensive packet filtering 
schemas by impersonating another host [46]. Most packet filtering and computer identity 
recognition protocols use IP addresses to determine a packet’s source and destination. By 
manipulating the IP addresses in the packets, attackers can conceal their identity, bypass 
defenses, and introduce malicious data or commands into a system thereby compromising 
its integrity.  
Man-in-the-middle attacks occur when an attacker is placed between the source 
and destination of a network communication [48]. From this vantage, attackers can see 
and modify network traffic between the endpoints, unbeknownst to the participants. 
Similarly, session replay is related to the man-in-the-middle attack, and is used by 
attackers to manipulate captured packet data and then replay it (e.g., in a banking 
transaction scenario) for a number of different effects [46].     
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter detailed capabilities needed to create a virtualized environment to 
conduct meaningful OCO testing. It examined the key factors required to create a 
virtualized scenario, as well as the interaction parameters needed to provide greater 
adherence to real-world malware behaviors. Finally, a list of attributes that are essential 
for the virtualized environment to be used for OCO planning, and rehearsal were derived. 
The next chapter describes the implementation of the derived interaction parameters into 













This chapter describes the approach used to implement advanced attack scenarios 
according to the requirements outlined in Chapter III. The interaction parameters 
described were the basis for new SimWare modules designed to test interesting types of 
cyber-attack scenarios. These scenarios were tested using MAST, which was the console 
used to launch the offensive cyber-attack modules, while a virtualized network provided 
the training area. A description of the test environment, the setup of the scenario files, 
and the attack modules developed are detailed in this chapter.  
B. TEST ENVIRONMENT 
The test environment is comprised of three important segments: the virtualized 
network infrastructure, the software tools used for execution of the cyber-attack 
scenarios, and the virtualized target hosts. All were important to designing and testing the 
cyber-attack scenarios, which were based on the derived interaction parameters and 
coded into the test attack modules. A detailed description of each of the segments 
follows. 
1. Virtual Network Infrastructure 
The test environment consisted of a virtual network infrastructure, using a Type I 
hypervisor implementation. The NPS Computer Science Department’s Cyber Battle Lab 
(CYBL) was used for the testing environment. This lab provided numerous benefits that 
facilitated the scenario testing, such as an infrastructure that was professionally managed, 
sufficient computer resources that allowed for the simulation of a sizeable network, and 
an isolated testing area to prevent collateral damage to any operational computer 
resources. This allowed the use of virtual hosts that had a high degree of configurability, 
a key requirement for the accurate modeling of an adversary network. vSphere, a server 
virtualization platform by VMware [49], served as the interface tool for the virtual 
environment.  
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A private network was also created and configured within the CYBL virtual space 
to allow communication between hosts on the subnet 10.1.99.1 – 10.1.99.255. Each host 
had a unique IP address, and required its own instance of the MAST client to be run 
locally. The network architecture was intentionally kept flat, with no additional subnets, 
to allow better examination of the behaviors of the new modules, and to avoid additional 
complexity that could have obscured the testing results. 
2. Software Tools 
MAST, a malware simulation tool described in Chapter II, served as the 
foundational platform from which the offensive cyber-attack methods were demonstrated. 
MAST is a custom software framework originally designed to facilitate the training of 
network administrators on live networks using SimWare. The MAST framework supports 
a capability to easily plug-in new SimWare modules for simulating malware effects, and 
allows the scenario author to combine SimWare modules to meet scenario objectives. 
New modules can support additional malware behaviors, attack types, or some 
combination thereof.  
IBM’s Java Integrated Development Environment (IDE) tool, Eclipse, was used 
to develop and compile the Java-based modules used for testing. Since MAST is also 
developed in Java, Eclipse was used to compile, run, and monitor its various components. 
The Java Development Kit (JDK), version 1.8, was used for compiling the prototype 
modules to maintain compatibility with MAST’s current Java libraries.  
3. Virtual Hosts 
The testing environment utilized eight virtualized Microsoft Windows-based 
clients running within vSphere. Each host was a Windows 7 Service Pack 1 VM, loaded 
with MAST and other tools needed to execute the tests. The host VMs included a full 
instantiation of the Windows OS and GUI, which allowed the workstations to be 
configured in any way that was needed to support the attack module and scenario. Every 
VM client required 2 gigabytes of host memory and 34 gigabytes of host storage for a 
total of 16 gigabytes of host memory and 272 gigabytes of host storage. Normally, 
intelligence would be gained via reconnaissance and scanning of the target network to 
 49
configure host services, ports, and firewalls to represent them with a high degree of 
accuracy. These tests, however, used default settings for the services and ports while the 
firewall was set to a permissive setting. These settings were chosen since they would not 
obscure the test results. For example, if a virtual host’s communication to another host 
had been blocked due to a firewall setting, the test of the module would have failed and 
thus the result would have been a false negative.  
The test setup used within the virtually hosted environment is shown in Figure 12. 
The VM hosts are listed on the far left-side, within the red box, while the network 
configuration within MAST and running clients are shown on the right-side of the figure. 
MAST does not resize the contents within its viewing area, so all eight hosts are not 
visible in this image. The center window allows selection of a scenario from a predefined 
list. The three new scenarios for this research are indicated in red, and include: “Attack 





















Figure 12.  Virtualized Test Network  
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C. SCENARIO FILE 
The scenario file is a set of instructions made up of key-value pairs and read by 
MAST to execute the desired scenario. A detailed description of the design choices and 
how MAST interacts with the scenario file are described in Belli’s thesis, “Extensible 
SimWare architecture for flexible training scenarios” [10]. Here, we only provide a brief 
overview of how the scenario file is used for this research. MAST can parse the 
commands in the scenario file and then direct the execution of those commands to the 
appropriate MAST clients. The MAST client runs as an application process on the host 
VMs.  
The scenario file consists of six sections that provide the MAST framework with 
instructions for how to execute the SimWare module(s), and how to perform subsequent 
actions based on return codes. Not all the sections need to be used in every scenario; for 
example, a scenario may not result in an infected host, in which case the infected section 
would be omitted. The scenario in Figure 13 was designed to launch an attack after five 
minutes (300 seconds) of user inactivity, illustrating an attack against a host whose user 
had walked away, thus leaving the machine idle. The attack was launched by the MAST 
framework to test a variant of the timing specific interaction parameter. We step through 
this scenario to explain each of the sections in the scenario file. 
1. Scenario 
This section is mandatory and provides two critical items of information to 
MAST. The first item is the name of the scenario. The name placed here will be 
displayed in the MAST GUI (reference Figure 12) scenario list. The user is 
allowed to select the desired scenario from this list. The second item, MinClients, 
is the minimum number of clients needed for the scenario to run properly, as 
determined by the scenario author. For this scenario, we selected the name 
“Attack When Idle” to provide a clear description of the scenario’s objective, with 
a requirement that at least one client be running.   
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Figure 13.  The “Attack When Idle” Scenario File 
2. Module List 
This section provides a listing of the SimWare modules that will be used 
for the scenario. It is referenced in the scenario file as [ModuleList], as shown in 
Figure 13. The listing order is not important because the individual modules are 
referenced by their number. Modules are the executable code, and do not have 
spaces in their name. The scenario in Figure 13 used “AttackWhenIdle”, a new 
module developed in Java to determine when a host machine is idle (i.e., when no 
user input is detected for a specified amount of time). It also used a pre-existing 
module, “EICAR,” which simulates a virus by writing a known virus signature 
pattern file to disk.   
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3. Group List  
In this section, the scenario author is able to specify the number of 
different groups that the clients will be assigned. The listing of the different 
groups is collected under the heading [GroupList]. This scenario used three 
groups, at least one group is always required. Groups can be assigned either a 
fixed number or a percentage of the total number of clients. In this instance, all of 
the clients are in Group #1. 
Having multiple groups allows the scenario writer to attack different 
groups with dissimilar attack events within the same scenario or move clients to 
new groups after some event, such as an infection. In this example, there is an 
infected segment that correlates to Group #3. Clients moved into Group #3 were 
marked as infected. This example denotes that all hosts will initially be in Group 
#1.  
4. Infected List 
This is the only optional section. The groups beneath the [Infected] section 
header tell MAST which group or groups contain infected hosts. Hosts that are 
infected via the scenario are colored red in the GUI viewing window (reference 
Figure 3) and a count of the number of infected hosts is also shown on the GUI 
console. Clients that have been infected but have not had their group changed to 
one of the infected groups will not show as infected on the GUI console.  
5. Command List 
This section lists the commands that will be subsequently executed via 
events. Commands are comprised of modules and their command line arguments, 
and are referenced by their index number. In the example shown in Figure 13, the 
module “AttackWhenIdle” accepts an input (300) for the number of seconds to 
wait before concluding that the client is idle. The “EICAR” module uses two 
command line parameter inputs to create a randomized wait time before writing 
its output file. The “EICAR” module was included to test whether the 
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“AttackWhenIdle” module could be stacked with other modules and perform the 
combined function correctly. The “EICAR” module was executed after the 
“AttackWhenIdle” module returned from a host that had been without user input 
for 300 seconds.  
6. Events 
This section combines the scenario commands and modules with the 
MAST event functionality to create functional scenario events. Commands are 
referenced by their index while modules are referenced by their name. The 
commands listed in the Command List can be ordered as the scenario designer 
desires, and can be directed at the different groups in the Group List. Event #1 in 
our example (see Figure 13) is a timer (T) event: 
1=T 2000 SGC 1 1 
The [Events] list is required to have a timer event as the first element. The timer 
event’s first parameter is the wait interval in milliseconds, 2000 in the example 
above. The rest of the event (SGC 1 1) instructs MAST to send a specific 
command from the Command List to a specific group from the Group List. The 
Send Group Command (SGC) [10] has the general form: 
(SGC) to <GROUPNUM> <COMMANDNUM> 
In the example Event #1, Command #1 (“AttackWhenIdle 300”) will be sent to all 
the clients in Group #1. Event #2 is a conditional event, based on the return code 
(RC) from the previous command in Event #1 (“AttackWhenIdle”):  
2=RC 1 AttackWhenIdle 1 SCC 2 
The return code event [10] has the general form: 
RC <GROUPNUM> <MODULENAME> <RETURNCODE> 
Event #2 evaluates the return code from the “AttackWhenIdle” module that was 
executed against the clients in Group #1. If the return code is a 1 from any client, 
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then that client would be sent the second command from the Command List for 
execution (“EICAR 50 5”) [10]. This command has the general form: 
Send Client Command (SCC) <COMMANDNUM> 
In our scenario, Event #1 invoked the Command #1 on Group #1 clients. Event #2 
checked to see whether the module returned any success codes (return code = 1). 
If so, then Command #2 (EICAR 50 5) will be issued to Group #1 clients. Event 
#3 is another return code (RC) conditional event: 
3=RC 1 EICAR 2 CG 3 
As before, this event will evaluate the return code from Group #1 clients from the 
execution of the “EICAR” command. If the return code from any client is 2, then 
the Change Group (CG) command will be executed on that particular client. Any 
client moved into Group #3 will have been displayed by the MAST GUI as 
infected because Group #3 was our infected group. Finally, Event #4 is another 
return code (RC) conditional event: 
4=RC 1 EICAR 456 CG 2 
This event will move any client that had a return code of 456 from the execution 
of the “EICAR” module from Group #1 to Group #2. These scenario files can be 
very complex when working with multiple groupings of clients and several 
command modules. This example was designed to demonstrate the scenario file 
concepts and was also used to test the “AttackWhenIdle” module. 
D. MODULES 
These programs and scenario files are at the heart of the MAST framework. They 
are the SimWare that creates the offensive cyber effects in the scenario. MAST allows 
the scenario designer a large degree of latitude to construct SimWare modules to meet 
mission objectives. The modules can be written in a compiled, scripted, or batch 
programming language. For this thesis, three new modules were developed, using the 
Java programming language, to implement several of the interaction parameters derived 
in Chapter III.  
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1. Detect Idle Host 
For the offensive cyber-attack scenario developer, the timing of an attack can be 
just as important as how it occurs. The capability to manipulate the temporal specificity is 
paramount for the development of realistic scenarios. This module provides a scenario 
author the ability to have his attack run at time when the user has not interacted with the 
target machine for some specified amount of time, to further obfuscate the attacker’s 
activity.  
In general, to determine user inactivity, this module can detect user inputs (mouse 
clicks or keyboard entries) and measures the amount of time a client system has been 
idle. If the idle time is greater than the timeout value passed as an argument, the module 
exits with a successful return code. If a user event has been detected, the timer is reset 
and the waiting begins anew. The motivation for this module is to find a time when the 
user is not at their computer so that subsequent exploit modules can be executed 
unnoticed.  
The code for this component was written in Java using JDK 1.8. For Windows 
systems, we invoked native shared libraries through the code using the capabilities within 
Java native access libraries [50]. This provided access to native Windows library 
functions that returns the time (in milliseconds) since the last user input action (i.e., 
keypress or mouse action). For non-Windows systems, a similar looping construct checks 
for any changes in the mouse coordinates over time. If no change occurred during the 
defined period, the system is determined to be idle, and a successful exit code is returned.  
The input parameter for the “AttackWhenIdle” module is the minimum number of 
seconds during which no user activity is detected. For example, if the scenario developer 
required two hours of user inactivity before executing subsequent SimWare events, he 
would pass 7,200 seconds as the input parameter. The return code for this module must 
correspond to what is expected in the scenario file. This module returns a 1 to denote 
success, however, if the client continues to receive user inputs, the timer would be reset 
each time and the module would keep waiting and checking an idle period beyond the 
timeout parameter. The logic for the module starts with an initial query of the idle time of 
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the host. If the idle time is less than the input time, the delta between the two is 
calculated. This differential time is used for the sleep interval. If the desired idle time has 
passed after the sleep interval has expired, the module will return the success code. 
Otherwise, the time differential is calculated again and the sleep process is repeated.  
The three Java classes shown in Figure 14 were used to implement the module. 
The IdleStatusCheck.java class parses the input arguments and returns the final status 
code to the calling program, MAST in this case. The IdleTest.java class performs the 
looping and differential time logic described in the preceding paragraph, while the 
WinIdleTime.java class returns the idle time in milliseconds via native Windows systems 
calls. The full code listing for the “AttackWhenIdle” executable module in shown in 
Appendix A. 
.   
Figure 14.   The Idle Test Classes Used for “AttackWhenIdle” 
2. Logic Bomb 
This module name draws its inspiration from the common term given to malware 
that will activate when a specific set of conditions occur, often at a pre-designated time, 
and thus a “logical time bomb.” This module provides the scenario author the ability to 
manipulate the temporal targeting aspect of the scenario, albeit in a materially different 
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way than with the “AttackWhenIdle” module. Its modular design also allows it to work in 
concert with other modules, such as the “EICAR” module, similar to the way 
“AttackWhenIdle” was shown in Figure 13.  
The logic for this module was designed to be efficient and stealthy. It uses a loop 
construct to check the current date against the date to execute supplied by the scenario 
author. If the execute date is after the current date, the differential time is calculated and 
is used as the parameter for the sleep function. Since the module cannot proceed until the 
current time is after the execute time, there is nothing gained by checking the time more 
frequently. When the execute date is less than the current date, the module will return a 
successful exit code. If the date argument given is less than the current date, the module 
will return a successful exit code immediately.  
Like its sibling, “AttackWhenIdle,” this module was written in Java using the 1.8 
version of the JDK. The only input parameter is the date when the SimWare is 
programmed to activate (i.e., return a success code). The format for the input parameters 
is a four-digit year, two-digit month, and two-digit day, followed by a two-digit hour 
(24hr format), with two-digit minutes and two-digit seconds. The general form is as 
follows: yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss. It would appear similar to the following example: 
[CommandList] 
1=LogicBomb 2017-03-05 13:30:10 
This module accepts its input parameter as a passed argument in the scenario file, 
similar to the demonstrated scenario in Figure 13, or it can receive the threshold time 
argument from an input window. The output, upon completion of a successful waiting 
period, is a successful exit code of 1. If the module receives no input time or bad input 
time data, either malformed or nonsensical, it will fail and return with an exit code of 
456.  
The Logic Bomb Java project consists of one Java class, CheckTimeGo.java, 
shown in Figure 15. This class has one method, main, which contains all the logic 




Figure 15.   Logic Bomb Project Hierarchy 
3. Target Specific Host 
The last two modules focused on some aspect of temporal specificity. This 
module enabled the target specificity on the logical level. The ability to target an 
adversary network or host by IP address or MAC address is vital for a scenario author to 
develop complex offensive scenarios. 
This module accepts one or more IP addresses, MAC addresses, or computer host 
names as the input parameter(s). This provides maximum flexibility for the scenario 
designer depending of the piece identifying data they may possess. For example, a 
scenario might have several hosts, with the goal to have the SimWare run on the two 
hosts that match the given IP addresses. Since a separate instance of the 
“TargetSpecificHost” module will run on each host, there can only be one matching IP 
address even if two IP addresses were given to the module. If the module determines a 
successful match of an IP address, MAC address, or host name it will exit with a return 
code of 2, 3, or 4, respectively. If no matches are found, the module exits with a returned 
code of 456. Similar to Figure 13, the input in the command list for the scenario file 
would appear similar to the following example: 
[CommandList] 





This logic for this module proceeds in a linear fashion. It loops through the input 
parameters and compares each one the host’s IP address. Java library functions are able 
to return the IP address for each host and for all its network interfaces (Ethernet, Wi-Fi, 
virtual). The hosts used in the testing had two network adapters each. If no matches are 
found, the same looping process is repeated again with the input parameters comparing 
them to each host’s computer name. The last looping iteration traverses the input list and 
compares each item in the list to each host’s MAC address checking for a match.  
The IP Specific Java project also consists of one Java class, 
TargetSpecificHost.java, shown in Figure 16. This class has four methods, which 
contains all the logic described for this module. The full code listing of the Target 
Specific Host module is shown in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 16.  The Classes and Methods Used for the “TargetSpecificHost” 
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we detailed the setup of the test environment and the processes 
used to conduct cyber scenario tests. Additionally, we examined the contents of a 
scenario file within the context of a new module. This should provide a better 
understanding of the workings of the scenario file, the capabilities of the new modules, 
and how they can be combined to create scenarios with increasingly complex interactions 
and behaviors. In the next chapter, the results of these scenario tests are analyzed, and a 
way ahead is plotted for future work. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
A. SUMMARY 
The objective of this thesis was to identify requirements for and build a system to 
support the development and testing of simulated offensive cyber operations scenarios. 
Although the DOD has cyber ranges where cyber scenario testing can take place, these 
ranges are in high demand, are expensive to operate and manage, and are not mobile. 
Moreover, the majority of commercial scenario development frameworks are for testing 
of network vulnerabilities and do not support the customization necessary to adapt the 
tool to DOD’s needs. This reality highlighted a capability gap that exists at the mid-to-
lower end of the offensive cyber scenario development and testing spectrum.  
At NPS, an active research initiative called MAST was designed to help train 
system administrators through the use of simulated malware (SimWare). This research 
was able to repurpose parts of MAST for the creation and testing of offensive cyber 
scenarios, focused on determining the elements useful for the formation of a robust 
offensive scenario development capability. From this work, we extended MAST with 
those elements to include new interaction parameters, a virtualized test environment, and 
a working prototype within an integrated, lightweight system.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The research objectives for this thesis were successfully accomplished. The 
derived requirements, modules, and research of existing frameworks yielded a capability 
that can be used for the development of offensive cyber-attack scenarios. The following 
examines the body of work produced by this thesis in light of the specific research 
questions set out in the objectives of the research.  
1. Research Questions 
Primary Question: How can offensive cyber tools and exploits be developed and 
tested effectively in a controlled environment against virtualized models of adversary 
networks? 
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Conclusion: This thesis derived several new concepts, and a working prototype 
that was able to support the development and testing of cyber-attack scenarios. We 
successfully repurposed and extended MAST to execute scenarios and modules 
specifically developed for this project. Additionally, a virtualized test environment was 
constructed within the NPS CYBL, which allowed for the modeling of a scalable notional 
adversary network. The network consisted of hosts that were complete instances of 
Windows 7 virtual machines. This allowed for effective testing of the new SimWare 
modules developed during this research.  
Secondary Question 2: What control mechanisms or methods would allow 
simulated malware to focus on a user-defined target set grouping (e.g., a single host or 
single subnet)? 
Conclusion: One test module was developed and successfully tested to target a 
specific host by IP address or MAC address addresses this question. The 
“TargetSpecificHost” module targeted one specific IP and one specific MAC address 
from among the eight virtual clients in the test environment. The system was able to 
successfully identify and infect that particular host, and only that host. The module is 
currently not able to target a single subnet (such as all hosts on 10.1.99.x), but can be 
extended later to support this capability.   
Secondary Question 3: What methods can be used to perform temporal 
sequencing of malware mimics? 
Conclusion: The development and implementation of two temporal specific 
modules, “LogicBomb” and “AttackWhenIdle,” provided a new capability that addresses 
this requirement. The “LogicBomb” module provided the ability to delay execution of 
subsequent modules in the scenario file to some pre-determined time in the future. The 
“AttackWhenIdle” module provided the ability to detect user inputs to a host machine, 
and delay attack until some author-specified idle time period had passed.  
Several test iterations were run based on various date/time inputs for the 
“LogicBomb” module, and various wait intervals for the “AttackWhenIdle” module. The 
“LogicBomb” module performed flawlessly across a series of clients. During one series 
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of early tests, it seemed that it may have been performing incorrectly on some clients, but 
further analysis revealed that the system time on these VM hosts was not correct, and the 
module was performing as designed. Similarly, when the “AttackWhenIdle” module was 
tested across multiple hosts, the results showed some clients becoming infected much 
quicker than expected. Further analysis revealed that there had been no user input on 
those clients, across multiple test iterations, for more than five minutes (the threshold 
value used or the AttackWhenIdle testing) and thus the module had performed as 
intended. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis was able to achieve a number of important milestones toward the 
creation of an offensive-oriented cyber scenario development platform. However, this 
thesis is only the first step in this process, having laid the groundwork upon which 
additional research can add even greater capabilities to the framework. Future research 
could focus on three core areas that would provide substantial improvement to the 
process of developing simulated cyber-attack scenarios: further development of advanced 
interaction parameters, integration of the MAST framework with the mapping and 
virtualization capabilities of MAVNATT (described in Chapter II), and enhancement of 
the MAST framework to support more robust scenario development. 
1. Advanced Parameters 
The temporal and target specificity modules provided the MAST framework with 
a significant increase in behavioral complexity that could be applied to other SimWare 
modules. However, several additional parameters were considered in this research, but 
were not implemented. Parameters such as skill, efficiency and stealth would add greater 
realism and nuanced behavior to the developed scenarios.  
These additional parameters could be developed and integrated within the MAST 
framework and selected via menus on the GUI. In this way, the parameters could be 
applied to any of the scenarios developed and used in the framework. For example, the 
skill parameter could be implemented as a weighted average, based on a selected value 
from the GUI menu, and could be applied to the module behavior that would be evaluated 
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at decision points during its execution. A physical analog of this idea would be a surface-
to-surface missile, where the guidance control systems provide accurate target 
discrimination and the operator has control over when the missile is launched.  However, 
if the missile flies with a high arching trajectory, it is still vulnerable to adversary 
countermeasures. If the missile were equipped with terrain hugging flight capabilities 
(stealth) to avoid enemy radar and evasive maneuvers to thwart enemy countermeasures 
(skill), these same features (stealth and skill) could be added to the MAST framework in 
a programmatic fashion to provide greater realism to the designed scenarios. 
The menu of SimWare modules available to MAST is still quite small. Before this 
research, there were only a small number of scans, virus emulator, and drive-by-
download type modules. The three new modules added to the framework nearly doubled 
the types of behaviors that could be used to create scenarios. Nonetheless, additional 
SimWare functionality still can be implemented that will provide other types of cyber-
attack such as DOS attacks, identity spoofing, man-in-the-middle, and a delivery vehicle 
such as a Trojan horse. These additional types of SimWare would greatly add to the range 
of scenarios that could be developed. 
2. Integration with MAVNATT 
For this thesis, a virtual network environment was constructed for the testing of 
the interaction behaviors. However, the success of the scenario ultimately depends on the 
accuracy of the model of the adversary network. MAVNATT has the capability to 
automatically map a network and then produce a virtualized instance of that network. 
Since MAST has been demonstrated to run successfully within a virtual environment, the 
marriage of MAST and MAVNATT could produce a synergy that leverages the best of 
both research initiatives. Integrating MAST within the virtual instance of a network 
mapped by MAVNATT would allow the full capability of MAST to generate and test 
scenarios against a virtualized replica of an adversary network.  
3. MAST Framework  
There are also improvements that can be made to the MAST framework itself to 
make it a more robust cyber-attack development platform. The first enhancement would 
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be a menu of available SimWare modules that can be selected from a GUI-style menu 
and loaded automatically into a scenario file shell. The second major improvement would 
be to add support for common programming constructs to the scenario file. If these 
improvements could be implemented, they would greatly increase the effectiveness of 
MAST as an offensive cyber-attack scenario development platform. 
Currently, the MAST scenario files have to be constructed manually by the 
scenario author. Knowing what modules are available for use in the scenario, and having 
quick access to them, would greatly facilitate scenario development. Moreover, a 
scenario that can be quickly constructed by selecting the desired modules from the 
SimWare menu and have MAST assemble them into a scenario file would speed the 
development of the various scenarios. 
MAST only allows linear processing of the scenario file at this time. There are no 
looping constructs, complex conditionals, or variable assignments within the current 
framework. These advanced programming features are very common in modern scripting 
languages such as Java Script, Bash shell, and others. If these advanced scripting 
constructs were implemented, this would allow the creation of scenarios many times 
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          System.err.println("No INPUT wait time given!!"); 
          System.err.println("exiting with failure return code!"); 
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                null,  
                     "Enter the date and time to start:\n", 
                "Temporal attack", 
                         JOptionPane.INFORMATION_MESSAGE,  
                null,                       
                null, 







      System.err.println("Nothing received for date‐time  
                                                            value, exiting!"); 
      System.exit(456); 
    } 
         




























        Thread.sleep(sleepTime); 
        currentTime = new Date(); 
         } catch (InterruptedException e) { 
        // TODO Auto‐generated catch block 
        e.printStackTrace(); 
        System.exit(456); 

































         
    Enumeration<?> e = null; 
    try { 
      e = NetworkInterface.getNetworkInterfaces(); 
    } catch (SocketException e1) { 























































































































      fw = new FileWriter(f1); 
    } catch (IOException e) { 
      e.printStackTrace(); 
    } 







        fw.write("Inputs: " + inputs[i] + " "); 
      } catch (IOException e) { 
        e.printStackTrace(); 





        System.err.println("No INPUT arguments given!!"); 
        System.err.println("exiting with failure return code!"); 
        fw.write("No INPUTS arguments given!"); 
        System.exit(returnCode); 
      } 
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